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Law Note
CURT FLOOD AT BAT AGAINST
BASEBALL'S "RESERVE CLAUSE"1
In all time of our distress,
And in our triumph too,
The game is more than the player of the game,
And the ship is more than the crew!
Rudyard Kipling,
A Song in A Storm
The sports page of today's newspaper is filled with accounts of
the labor-management problems of the world of professional sports.
1. The reserve system ... is the heart of plaintiff's complaint.
No player seeking to play baseball professionally in this country
can avoid its strictures since it applies to all clubs, in both the
major and minor leagues and thus all of organized baseball. The
effect of this system is to restrict a player throughout his baseball
life to negotiate with only one club at any one time; that club
being either the one with which he begins his career or the club to
which his contract is assigned.
... The Uniform Player's Contract provides in part that if in
the year of expiration of the contract a player and a club do not
reach agreement on a new contract by a certain date, the club may
unilaterally renew the existing contract subject to certain salary
controls. Such renewal contract would itself contain this re-
newal clause. ...
Another section of this same Uniform Contract provides that a
player's contract may be assigned, without his approval, to any
other major league club in accordance with the baseball rules.
To insure respect for these contract rights once obtained by a
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Prominent-are the National Football League players' strike and the
owners' lockout; the ,suit of the National Basketball Players' As-
sociation to bar the merger plans of the National Basketball As-
sociation and the American Basketball Association; former ,boxing
champion Cassius Clay's suit to gain reinstatement of his boxing
licenses and credentials; and Curt Flood's suit seeking the elimi-
nation of baseball's reserve system. Flood's case focuses upon many
of the differences which exist between the players and the owners
of professional sports.
In 1969 Curt Flood received a $90,000 salary. He was one of the
highest paid and most respected players in the game of baseball.
He had been a frequent .300 hitter, a seven time Golden Glove
Award winner and was generally acclaimed to be the best center-
fielder in baseball.2 Now, in the prime of his career, Flood has
seemingly forsaken his future as a player 3 to legally eliminate base-
ball's reserve system.
After the completion of the 1969 season Flood's Uniform Con-
tract was assigned by the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia
Phillies. Under the operation of his contract and its reserve pro-
visions, Flood was given two alternatives. He could contract to
play for the Phillies or not play at all within organized baseball.
In a letter to Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn in late December
1969, Flood asked to be released from the reserve provisions of his
contract to enable him to* receive employment offers from clubs
other than Ph-iadelphia. -Kuhn denied Flood's request. Flood de-
clined the contract offer of Philadelphia 4 and filed suit seeking to
club, Rule 4-A of the Major League and Professional Baseball
Rules provides that each club may placa its players on a reserve
list . . . and thereafter no player on any list shall be eligible to
play for or negotiate with any other club until his contract has
been assigned or he has been released.
Flood V. uhii, 309^F. Supp. 793, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denial of motion
for prelimiiary injunction).
2. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 19, 1968, at 19-20.
3. It is apparent that Flood desires to carry his action to the Supreme
Court. This would likely idle him for three seasons. Baseball involves
skills and timing which have to be continually exercised. As a result of
three years iiactivity, it is unlikely that Flood will ever regain the
skills and expertise he had prior to his lawsuit.
Subsequent to writing this article, Flood's Uniform Contract was assigned
by Philadelphia to the Washington Senators. Flood subsequently signed a
one year Uniform Contract for a reported $110,000. The contract specifically
stipulated that it would in no way prejudice Flood's suit. Washington Post,
Nov. 5, 1970, § F, at 1, col. 6.
4. Philadelphia offered Flood the same $90,000 salary he received in
have the enforcement of the reserve system enjoined and to have
the reserve system declared an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of federal antitrust laws.
Flood is receiving strong support from the players of other or-
ganized sports as well as the Major League Baseball Players' As-
sociation.5 Prior to the filing of his suit Flood sought and ob-
tained the unanimous support of the Baseball Players' Association
including a promise of financial aid.6 The Baseball Players' Associa-
tion, in their collective bargaining with the club owners, has unsuc-
cessfully sought the elimination or modification of the reserve sys-
tem.7 Baseball owners have prospered with the reserve system and
are convinced that it is necessary for the preservation of the game.8
Two Supreme Court decisions9 have exempted baseball from the
application of the federal antitrust laws. So long as the owners
in good faith bargain with the Players' Association, they are sub-
stantially free from an unfair labor practice sanction.10 The
owners are not required to make concessions with regard to nego-
tiations upon the subject of the reserve system."
Considering the favorable legal position and the stand that the
reserve system is essential to the preservation of the game, the
owners are reluctant to allow any changes in the system. Thus,
the Flood suit affords the Players' Association the most effective
means, short of a costly strike, to force a change in the system.
12
1969. They would also have let Flood play without prejudice to his law-
suit. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1970, at 50, col. 5.
5. The National Hockey League Player's Association gave their support
to Curt Flood in his suit against baseball. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1970, at
52, col. 3. In basketball, the National Basketball Player's Association
filed suit seeking the declaration that basketball's reserve system, which is
patterned after baseball's, is an illegal restraint of trade. N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1970, at 34, col. 1.
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1969, at 42, col. 1.
7. Players Go to Bat Against Baseball, BusiNEss W=EK, Feb. 28, 1970,
at 74.
8. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), at 73-75, 80-84 [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Memo].
9. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
10. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964) provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bar-
gain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... .
11. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) provides:
"[S]uch obligation [to bargain collectively] does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ... "
12. The bargaining roles of the Players' Association and the owners are
not typical of the conventional employer-union relationship. The Play-
ers' Association is not the players' representative for the negotiation of
salaries. The players individually negotiate terms of their salary. The
Players' Association collectively bargains for the other terms of employ-
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Baseball's Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws
Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "Every
combination . .. or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States. . . is declared to be illegal .... 1u
In 1922 the Supreme Court held in Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more v. National League"4 that the business of providing public
baseball exhibitions did not fall within the provisions of the Sher-
man Act. Justice Holmes, for the Court, explained that baseball
"... would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly
accepted use of those words."' 5 He further explained that ex-
hibitions of baseball were "purely state affairs."'16 Justice Holmes
analogized the business of performing baseball exhibitions to the
business of issuing insurance policies.' 7 Insurance policy writing
had been exempted from the effect of the federal antitrust laws
because the policies were, like baseball exhibitions, local in nature.'8
By the latter 1940's, the criteria of interstate commerce used by
the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball had become obsolete. The
Court' had repeatedly asserted that activity 'which crosses state
borders,19 activity ' vhich uses the ctannels of interstate cbm-
merce,20 or any local activity which even remotely concerns other
states or interstate 'commdrc6 21 falls within the classification of
commeice power.' Thus tests of direct or indirect effects 'on'inter-
state commerce or' the namount of -interstate business activity in-
volved became'irrelevant.22
ment such as minimum,salaries, arbitration procedures, and, fringe bene-
fits: . . .
14. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
15. Id at 209.
16. Id. at 208.
17. Id. at '209. "According to the distinction insisted upon in Hooper v.
California . .'.. the -transport [of players from state to state] is a mere
incident, not the essential thing . .. ."
18. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654 (1895).
19. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
20. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
21. Cf. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
22. Mandville Island 'Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948) (combination among local sugar refiners to pay uniform
prices to local beet growers held a violation of Sherman Act) (modern
approach draws no sharp line where interstate commerce ends and in-
In 1944 the insurance antitrust exemption case upon which
Federal Baseball relied was invalidated.23 The Court held that
".. . [A] nationwide business is not deprived of its interstate char-
acter merely because it is built upon sales contracts which are
local in nature. '24 The Court stated that no business ". . . which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly
beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insur-
ance."
25
Baseball's federal antitrust exemption was not challenged until
1949 when blacklisted player Danny Gardella sued the Commis-
sioner of Baseball for damages incurred for his exclusion from
baseball via the reserve system. Gardella sought a declaration that
baseball's reserve system was an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the federal antitrust laws. The district court dismissed
the complaint on the authority of Federal Baseball.20  The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded concluding that
the business of baseball pro tanto was engaged in interstate com-
merce.27 Judge Learned Hand reasoned that the development of
radio and television broadcasts subsequent to the 1922 Federal Base-
ball case was a sufficient factor to change the nature of the busi-
ness of baseball to fall within the terminology of trade and com-
merce used in the antitrust laws. He depicted the broadcasts as
not merely incident, but that ". . [T] he players are the actors, the
radio listeners and the television spectators are the audiences; to-
gether they form as indivisible a unit as do actors and spectators in
a theatre. '28 Nevertheless, Judge Hand concluded that the district
court, as a trier of fact, would have to determine whether the busi-
ness of baseball in 1949 was interstate commerce before the court
of appeals could rule upon the validity of the reserve system.20
Judge Frank, concurring, thought that baseball's radio and televi-
sion activities necessarily placed it within interstate commerce. 10
trastate commerce begins); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat
grown only for consumption on the farm nevertheless held subject to com-
merce power); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(the character of the restraint is illegal, not the amount of commerce
affected).
23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
24. Id at 547.
25. Id. at 553.
26. Gardella v. Chandler, .79 F. Supp. 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
27. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d. Cir. 1949).
28. Id. at 407-08.
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id. at 414-15.
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Judge Frank .concluded that, subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court completely destroyed the validity of Federal Baseball.-1
Two other players, Fred Martin and Max Lanier, were black-
listed in the same way that Gardella was. They sought judicial
relief for alleged antitrust violations by the owners of baseball.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position taken
in Gardella v. Chandler. The Second Circuit held that the validity
of the reserve clause would have to be tested by a trial court in-
volving ". . . consideration, among other things, of the needs and
conduct of the business as a whole.
'32
The Second Circuit rulings in Gardella and Martin v. National
League Baseball Club threatened to upset the secure position which
baseball had enjoyed since 1922. However, the suits were never
retried as out of court settlements and the reinstatement of the
three players averted such a showdown.
Following the Gardella and Martin suits Congress discussed the
issue of the baseball exemption. In 1951, four bills 33 were intro-
duced in Congress to study baseball's antitrust exemption. The
congressional study came to the conclusion that it was too early to
enact general legislation for baseball. The legislators wanted to
wait until the courts decided upon the reasonableness of the
reserve clause.
34
The courts had another opportunity to weigh the problem in
three suits brought by disgruntled baseball players heard between
1951 and 1953. 35 The three suits were decided together by the Su-
preme Court in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.86 Toolson
was another suit by a blacklisted player for damages and the
declaration that the reserve system was an unreasonable restraint
31. Id. at 408.
32. Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917, 918 (2d
Cir. 1949).
33. H.R. 4229, 4230, and 4231, and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
34. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as House Report].
35. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952); Kawalski v. Chandler, No.
2646 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 1952), affd per curiam, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.
1953); and Corbett and El Paso Baseball Club v. Chandler, No. 2589 (S.D.
Ohio, Jan. 25, 1952), affd per curiam, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953).
36. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
of trade in vi6lation of the federal antitrust laws. Toolson, in a
similar situation as Flood, refused to accept the assignment of his
contract from one club to another and thus, under the operation
of the reserve system, he was blacklisted. The case presented many
of the same issues that had been raised by. Gardella and Martin.
On certiorari, the Supreme, Court affirmed the lower court dismis-
sal on the authority of Federal Baseball without re-examining the
underlying issues.V The Court concluded that if any reasons ex-
isted wuch warranted application of antitrust laws to baseball,
they should be applied by legislation.38 Although Toolson affirmed
the authority' of Federal Baseball, it further broadened the older
.. so far as that decision [Federal Baseball] determines that
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball
within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."39
Justice Burton, in his dissent in Toolson, observed that the Su-
preme Court in 1922 did not hold that baseball would be forever
exempt from the federal antitrust laws. Instead, he reasoned, Fed-
eral Baseball held that the activities of baseball did not amount
to interstate commerce in 1922.40 He expressed the opinion that
the business of baseball had sufficiently changed since 1922 to be
classified as interstate commerce and, thus was subject to the
antitrust laws. 4'
Nowhere in the three page opinion of Federal Baseball can there
be found any mention of Congress' intention that baseball was to
be excluded from the scope of the antitrust laws as held by Toolson.
During the period after Federal Baseball and before Toolson, Con-
gress enacted no express legislation pro or con regarding exemp-
tions for baseball or any other professional sport from the effects
of the federal antitrust laws.4 2 The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of legislative intent came entirely from Congressional inaction
to change the decision of the Court in Federal Baseball. It is
difficult to-understand how the Supreme Court in Toolson reached
such a conclusion in light of its previous decisions applying antitrust
laws to other businesses having interstate connections similar to
baseball.43 Nevertheless, Toolson today stands for the proposition
37. Id. at 356-57.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. at 357-58.
41. Id. at 360.
42. See House REPORT, supra note 34, for an analysis of Congressional
inaction.
43. Two previous Supreme Court decisions concerning similar busi-
nesses held them applicable to antitrust laws. United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (distribution and showing of mo-
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that it was Congress' intent that baseball would not fall within the
scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Toolson have es-
tablished baseball as the only professional sport or similar business
exempt from the effect of the antitrust laws. In 1955 the Court
held that the booking of theatrical attractions on a multi-state
basis was subject to antitrust laws.4 4 The Court would not accept
petitioner's argument that the rationale of Toolson exempted their
business from the antitrust laws. The Court explained that Tool-
son was merely a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.4 5
In United States v. International Boxing Club it was held that pro-
fessional boxing fell within the provisions of the antitrust laws.4 6
In a dispute between a player and professional football the Court
held that the business of professional football fell within the pro-
visions of the federal antitrust laws and specifically limited the
application of Toolson to the business of baseball.47 The Court
again reiterated their position that if any changes were to be made
regarding baseball's antitrust exemption they would have to be
made by Congress.
48
Despite the Supreme Court's invitations to legislatively recon-
sider the antitrust exemption which baseball enjoys, Congress has
not enacted such legislation. No less than fifty bills and five hear-
ings have been considered on the subject since Toolson was de-
cided.49 To date, Congress has passed only two measures concern-
ing matters of antitrust for professional sports.50
While the decision of Flood's trial was pending, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Salerno v. American League5 ' affirmed the
tion pictures in local theatres); Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange,
262 U.S. 271 (1923) (booking of vaudeville exhibitions).
44. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
45. Id. at 230.
46. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
47. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957).
48. Id. at 451.
49. For a summary of these bills and hearings, see S. REP. No. 462,
89th Cong., 7-12 (1965).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1964) (permitted professional football and other
professional sports to adopt joint telecasting practices); 15 U.S.C. § 1291
(1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (authorized the merger of the Na-
tional and American Football Leagues).
51. Salerno v. American League, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
dismissal of a suit by two discharged umpires based on the author-
ity of Toolson. The umpires had contended that the business
of baseball was interstate commerce and therefore should fall
within the provisions of the antitrust laws. The court explained
that whether or not baseball's activities sufficiently affected inter-
state commerce was not at issue, as the ground upon which Tool-
son rested was that Congress had no intention of bringing baseball
within the antitrust laws.52 They also said that except for situa-
tions where prior opinions establish a near certainty that a case
will be overruled, ". . . [W] e continue to believe that the Supreme
Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own
decisions . . .,53
Therefore, the Southern District Court of New York was man-
dated by Toolson and the decision of its own appellate court in
Salerno to dismiss Flood's suit in August 1970.5 4 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals will surely follow its decision made in Sal-
erno?.
Thus the path is cleared for the Supreme Court to consider
whether or not they will overrule Toolson should the question be
so directed and should they grant certiorari.
The Implication of Toolson
In Salerno55 the Second Circuit explained:
• . . [T]he rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and .. .the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'un-
realistic,' 'inconsistent' and 'illogical' .... [W] e should not fall
out of our chairs with surprise at the news that Federal Baseball
and Toolson had been overruled .... 56
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit was not at all sure the Supreme
Court would overrule. 57 Toolson may have been improperly de-
cided in 1953, but Flood must show today why it should be over-
ruled.
Upon first impression, an analysis of the Toolson decision would
indicate its dubious rationale. However, upon further examination
the basis for such an irrational decision is revealed. The Supreme
Court in 1953 was asked to overrule Federal Baseball and to hold
baseball retroactively subject to antitrust laws.58 The Court was
52. Id. at 1005.
53. Id.
54. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. Salerno v. American League, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
56. Id. at 1005.
57. Id.
58. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. at 357.
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concerned about the flood of litigation that would follow a retro-
active overruling of their 1922 decision and the effect that this
would have upon the substantial interests baseball had developed
in reliance upon its antitrust exemption.59
In analyzing Flood's case, the Supreme Court will need to con-
sider the same pivotal issues it reviewed in 1953 with Toolson.
The Court will need to determine whether it will overrule Toolson
with retroactive effect, how to assess baseball's reliance upon its
antitrust exemption, and whether or not the reserve system is an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
60
The Overruling of Toolson with Retroactive Effect
The Supreme Court in Toolson expressed the dangers of granting
retroactive effect to the requested overruling of Federal Baseball.
The Court distinguished between the judicial solution which would
have retroactive effect and the legislative solution which would
have prospective effect.
61
Normally, when a decision is overruled, this signifies not that the
precedent was bad law, but that it was not law at all.62 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has given additional flexibility to the
use of prospective overruling. They have seen the need to balance
the equities of the parties and deny retroactive effect in particu-
lar where the parties have ordered their affairs in reliance upon
what they perceived the law to be.
63
59. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. at 450-51.
60. The other arguments presented by the Flood case are not discussed.
These include: (1) If federal antitrust laws do not apply, then the in-
dividual state antitrust laws are applicable; (2) if neither federal nor state
antitrust laws apply, then principles of common law would apply to find
the reserve system unreasonable; and (3) the reserve system violates the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. These ar-
guments were denied by the trial court. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at
280, 281-82.
61. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. at 357.
62. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68-70.,
63. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejske, 399 U.S. 204, 214 (1970) (issuance of
municipal bonds violated voting rights; but the ruling was given prospec-
tive effect); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13, 14 (1969) (prospectively
overruled a decision but allowed immediate litigant retroactive applica-
tion); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24-25 (1964) (reserved the
question of whether the antitrust laws should be given prospective effect);
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1961) (prospectively overruled
a previous decision that embezzled funds were not taxable income).
Recognizing the problems presented by a retroactive decision,
Flood seeks a decision which is partly or wholly prospective. He
seeks to differentiate his case from Toolsom by requesting damages
only from December 30, 1969, the time when his request to be re-
leased from the reserve provisions of his contract was denied. The
Supreme Court has given application of prospective overruling to
events that occur after the date of its decision except as to the
litigants immediately before the Court.64
Because of the strong likelihood of successive suits by others in
similar situations, the Supreme Court is always reluctant to give a
retroactive decision. It is apparent that should the Supreme Court
overrule Toolson, they would do so without retroactive applica-
tion. There is great difficulty when overruling in determining at
what time the question of its effect will become effective. Such
difficulty could, as in Toolson, weigh heavily on the redetermina-
tion that Congress is better equipped to make a prospective ruling.
Baseball's Reliance upon Antitrust Exemption
The Supreme Court was concerned in Toolsonr that baseball had
expanded in reliance on their antitrust exemption.65 In the seven-
teen years since Toolson, baseball has continued to grow in reliance
of this exemption and in particular upon the validity of base-
ball's reserve system. In the years since Toolson was decided, the
number of professional major league teams has increased from six-
teen to twenty-four. The latest franchise was sold for over ten
million dollars.6 6 The only assets of any significance that are con-
nected with a franchise are the skills and the fan identity of the
players. Without a reserve system to protect these assets the fran-
chise would be of little value.67 Because of baseball's continued
economic expansion, the Court, even more than in 1953, will have
to consider the effect its decision will have on baseball's reliance
upon its antitrust exemption.
The Reasonableness of the Reserve System
Whether or not an act restrains trade under the Sherman Act
is based on the rule of reason. 68  The rule of reason is that not
64. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13, 14 (1969); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1967).
65. 346 U.S. at 357.
66. Interview with Buzzie Bavasi, President and co-owner of the San
Diego Padres Baseball Club, in San Diego, California, Aug. 21, 1970.
67. Id.
68. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
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every act or combination restraining trade is illegal, but only
those which have an undue or unreasonable tendency toward mo-
nopoly or its attendant evils. The rule has been developed and
applied in Supreme Court decisions, although its fundamental un-
certainty makes prediction extremely difficult.69
Flood contends that the reserve system unreasonably restricts
the player's freedom to choose where, for whom and for how much
he will work.7 0 The defendants explain that the reserve system is
reasonable and necessary to secure the legitimate objectives of their
joint league venture3 1
On first impression, a review of baseball's reserve system indi-
cates that it is too restrictive. Judge Cooper, in denying Flood's
motion for a preliminary injunction, noted that the system ap-
peared ". . . excessively restrictive, far beyond that necessary to
protect its aims .... ,,72 The major purpose to hold Flood's trial
was to make the determination whether or not the reserve system
was reasonable.7 3 Upon further consideration it became apparent
that to make such a determination would be very difficult. Judge
Cooper took refuge behind the mandate of Toolson concluding that
there was no basis to warrant considering the underlying question
of the reasonableness of the reserve system.74  However, Judge
Cooper noted that the testimony at the trial failed to support the
view held by many that the reserve system occasioned rampant
abuse. He determined that there was no general disregard of the
position which the player occupied.
7 5
The adverse effect which the reserve system may have upon
the bargaining position of the player can be illustrated by the
only extreme case found. Ken Harrelson, a player from the then
Kansas City Athletics, was given an unconditional release from his
69. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969);
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
Maryland and Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
70. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) at 10, 19
[hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief].
71. See Defendant's Memo, supra note 8, at 58-85.
72. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 801 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
73. Id. at 809.
74. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 277-78.
75. Id.
contract due to disciplinary action. At the time of his release he
was playing exceptionally well. The unconditional release en-
abled Harrelson to bargain freely with the other clubs. He finally
signed for an estimated $75,000 salary. Before the change he re-
ceived only an average salary.7 6 In the short term, it has been the
experience of professional players that where there are competing
clubs or leagues with no restrictive contracts, higher salaries can
be obtained.77 Defendants argue, and with persuasive precedent on
their side, that where the competition for player services is un-
bridled, soon the leagues and clubs are unable to survive.7 8
The courts have recognized that some form of a reserve system is
needed to preserve the balance among the league teams. Experi-
ence and common sense indicate that fan interest and profits are
greatest when all teams are able to compete effectively for the
league championship.7 9  In the absence of restraints upon player
movement, the best players would be purchased by the wealthiest
teams.8 0 Thus if such an unrestrained system existed, the cham-
76. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 4, 1967, at 52.
77. Notable examples are: Pete Maravich signed a five year pact with
Atlanta of the National Basketball Association for an estimated $1.5 mil-
lion. The salary is believed to be the highest ever paid for a basketball
player. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1970, at 4, col. 5 (it is notable that the pro-
posed merger between the NBA and the ABA is now before Congress); the
year before their merger, the National and American Football Leagues re-
portedly paid $7 million to sign 20 college players. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1966, § V, at 2, col. 2; before the merger of the football leagues, quarter-
back John Brodie of the San Francisco 49er's, who had played out the
option provision of his contract, succeeded in obtaining a 12 year contract
for $921,000 from the 49er's. The Fabulous Brodie Caper, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Aug. 29, 1966, at 20. During 1914 and 1915, when the Federal
Baseball League was in a bidding war for player personnel with the Na-
tional and American Leagues, Ty Cobb's salary increased from $12,000 to
$20,000. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 52-53.
78. Of the twenty-five clubs which competed in the first professional
league, 1871-75, sixteen were financial failures due to the competition for
players' services. Eight of the nine survivors formed the National League,
but until the reserve system was put into effect no club could make
money. HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 18-25. The bidding war of the
National and American Football Leagues led to their merger sanctioned by
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966). The bidding war
of the American and National Basketball Associations has led to their
proposed merger. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1970, at 42, col. 2.
79. A club which wins 63 percent of its games tends to draw twice as
many fans as it would if it won 42 percent and three times as many as if
it won only 25 percent of its games. The desire of each club in employing
the best player talent to win a high percentage of its games is not con-
sistent with the overall performance of the league. A league derives 50
percent more gate receipts if the pennant-winning club averages .575 in
won and lost percentage than if it averages .750. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 34, at 103-05. The run-away of the National League pennant in 1968
by the St. Louis Cardinals cost the league an estimated $50,000 per day in
lost gate receipts. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 19, 1968, at 19.
80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 104-05.
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pionships would be dominated by the teams with the most money
while the poorer teams would continually lose.81 Only one club in
a league can win the championship and unless the losers can also
prosper, the victor of one year may become bankrupt the next
year through lack of opponents to play.82 Such a result would in
the long term eliminate the market for players.83
In Flood v. Kuhn, Judge Cooper commented on the reserve
system: ". . . [W] e find no general or widespread disregard of the
extremely important position the player occupies."84 An analysis of
the average salaries paid to players for a five month season also
fails to indicate an inadequate bargaining position. The average
salary for the 1970 season was $28,376.85 The highest paid team in
baseball in 1968, when the league average was less than today, was
the St. Louis Cardinals. The average player salary was $38,800
with the starting nine, including Curt Flood, averaging $62,800.86
Baseball's reserve system is not essentially different from the
reserve systems and practices used by the other professional sports.
Clubs in professional football, basketball and hockey have all pat-
terned their practices of restricting player mobility after base-
ball's.8 7 Professional football relies upon a nominally less restric-
tive system than the other professional sports in the form of its
"option clause."88
Flood, to show that the reserve system is unreasonable, proposed
81. Id. at 111-27.
82. Id. at 104-05.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 276.
85. Based upon the player contracts filed in the league offices. Defend-
ant's Memo, supra note 8, at 76.
86. See Not Just a Flood, But a Deluge, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 19, 1968,
at 19; SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. ?, 1968, cover.
87. Hearings before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 1, pt 6, at 1504-05 (1951).
88. The football player's contract has an option which can only be
unilaterally extended one year. The player can play the additional year
without signing a new contract at 90 percent of his previous year's sal-
ary. Upon playing out his option, the player becomes a free agent who is
able to negotiate with any club. But if another club signs a player who
has played out his option, the signing club must compensate the player's
former team with a player or players of similar value and abilities.
Because of the unknown factor of the compensation provision which is
enforced by the commissioner of football, most clubs are reluctant to
negotiate with a player who has played out his option.
various modifications which would satisfy the aims of baseball and
also provide greater player freedom.8 9 The district court though,
was not asked to determine whether there was a better alter-
native to the reserve system. They were only asked to consider
whether or not the present system was and is reasonable. In Tool-
son, the Supreme Court did not rule on the reasonableness of the
reserve system. A ruling that the reserve system was an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade would have left baseball without the pro-
tection of any kind of a reserve system. 0 They reasoned that
Congress was better equipped to resolve that difficult question. 1
Congress, if they concluded that the reserve system was unreason-
able, would not be forced to abolish such a system altogether.
Congress could enact an appropriate alternative or modification to
the reserve system while keeping intact the essential goals of
baseball.
Labor Antitrust Exemption
The Clayton Act provides that labor organizations may not be
restrained from lawfully performing their legitimate objects and
that they are not to be considered illegal combinations or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade. 92 The Norris-LaGuardia Act extends la-
bor's protection by prohibiting injunctions against certain kinds
of labor activities. 93 The effect of these statutes is to make ordi-
nary concerted activity by the union immune from antitrust sanc-
tions.9 4
In addition to their present antitrust exemption via Toolson,
baseball contends that the application of the federal labor statutes
exempts the reserve system from the operation of the antitrust
lawsY5 To fall within the collective bargaining provisions of the
89. Flood proposed the following changes to the reserve system: (1) in-
dependent leagues; or (2) a reserve system limited to a term of years or al-
lowing a player to become a free agent after the option period expired;
and (3) provide a trade veto for a veteran player; or (4) an automatic
salary progression or smaller reserve list; and (5) salary arbitration pro-
cedures. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 70, at 39-46.
90. Clearly the preponderance of credible proof does not favor
elimination of the reserve clause. With the sole exception of the
plaintiff himself, it shows that even plaintiff's witnesses do not
contend that it is wholly undesirable; in fact they regard sub-
stantial portions meritorious.
Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 276.
91. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. at 452.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
94. American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968);
Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
95. Defendant's Memo, supra note 8, at 25. For an analysis of the
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National Labor Relations Act, there must be competent represen-
tation and good faith bargaining on mandatory subjects.9 6 Base-
ball contends that they qualify in that the Players' Association is
a proper representative to bargain on the subject of the reserve
system,97 that there has been good faith bargaining on the sub-
ject,98 and that the reserve system is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.
99
Baseball relies upon Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co.'00 to
support their contention that the mandatory subject of bargaining,
the reserve system, is exempt from antitrust sanctions. In a three-
three divided opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the ac-
tivities of the union in imposing marketing hours upon the em-
ployer were clearly within the labor exemption from the effect of
the Sherman Act as established in prior decisions.' 0 1 Justice White,
writing for the majority, explained: "The crucial determinant is
not the form of the agreement-e.g. prices or wages-but its rela-
tive impact on the product market and the interests of union
members."'102 The defendants claim that their reserve system
clearly falls within the provisions which Justice White set out, in
that the reserve system has impact upon the product market and
concerns the interests of the union members. Justice Goldberg
wrote for the three man minority asserting: ". . . [C] ollective
similar argument made in Toolson, see Note, Monopsony in Manpower:
Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 613-21
(1953).
96. . . . [T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
97. "The Major League Baseball Players' Association . .. has proved a
particularly effective bargaining representative .... " Flood v. Kuhn, 316
F. Supp. at 283.
98. Players Go to Bat Against Baseball, Busnuss -WEK, Feb. 28, 1970,
at 74.
99. "Both management and the Players' Association recognize the reserve
system to be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining." Flood v.
Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 283.
100. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
101. Id. at 682, 683. The prior decisions referred to are: Hunt v. Crum-
boch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); United States v. American Federation of Musi-
cians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
102. Meat Cutters Union v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965).
bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining
under the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws."'10 He
explained that Congress intended to prevent judges and juries,
under the pretense of antitrust sanctions, from prying into the
private negotiations of the employer and the union on subjects of
mandatory bargaining.
10 4
Flood claims that there is a difference between the conspiracy
among employers who restrain trade and labor unions who conspire
to restrain trade. He asserts that Jewel Tea does not allow the
employer such an exemption. 05 He relies upon a 1949 Supreme
Court case which held that certain contractors' illegal restraint of
trade did not fall within the labor union's antitrust exemption. 00
The Court explained that ".... [The] benefits to organized labor
cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out
of the antitrust fires.
'1 °07
Judge Cooper, in reviewing Flood's motion for a preliminary in-
junction, recognized the substantial and complex questions raised
by the labor agreement exemption. 08 In his subsequent decision he
reaffirmed his belief of its difficulty and took refuge behind Tool-
son just as he had done on the question of the reasonableness of
the reserve system. 0 9
Conclusion
Judge Cooper suggests that the most effective solution to the
controversy surrounding the reserve system will come through
negotiation of the respective bargaining units. The Players' As-
sociation is now sufficiently powerful to effect meaningful agree-
ments thus enabling the players to gain greater bargaining parity
with the owners. The National Labor Relations Board exercised
jurisdiction over the business of baseball for the first time in De-
cember 1969.110 This significant step enables both baseball and
the players a forum where they may bring any unfair practice or
103. Id. at 710. Justice Goldberg is now one of plaintiff Flood's coun-
selors.
104. Id. at 716.
105. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Reply Brief, Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) at 1.
106. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
107. Id. at 464. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797
(1945).
108. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. at 806.
109. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. at 278.
110. American League and Association of Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 30,
72 LRRM 1545 (1969).
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grievance charges. This same step may also present the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to bypass the difficult antitrust prob-
lems presented by the Flood case.
JOHN J. MCQUAIDE
